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cc: 'D/OTE (To prepare response for DDA's signature. Suspense 3 September 85.)

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7 August 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

Deputy Director for Intelligence Deputy Director for Operations

Deputy Director for Science and Technology Director, Office of Training and Education

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Soviet Affairs Training Program

I would like to pursue a recommendation by the PFIAB that we set up an in-house program designed to improve our overall understanding of the Soviet Union. The concept would involve bringing together all those with the requisite expertise to provide a course of study that would run the gamut of Soviet military, economic, political, operational, etc., activities in an integrated way. This training would be made available to any and all officers, regardless of Directorate, who deal in Soviet affairs. In addition to drawing on our most experienced case officers and analysts, we should look to emigres and defectors, as well as certain people from the business and scientific community who are knowledgeable of, and/or frequently travel in, the Soviet Union. Obviously, such a program should also deal with such subjects as Soviet active measures, deception, disinformation, etc.

I think this proposal has merit. It would allow for the exchange of knowledge and experience, improve the totality of our efforts to deal with the different aspects of the Soviet problem, and lead to officers (analysts, case officers, technical specialists) who would be better prepared for assignments in the field or in Headquarters. If it proves successful, we can consider including other members of the Community, such as attaches, in the program.

Finally, I'd like to have suggestions for candidates to head this effort; here, too, we need to look for the person who best can provide the dynamic leadership a program of this kind needs--we don't need to restrict ourselves to current employees, either. I'd like to have the report of Stan's group, with your comments, in about a month.

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